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Abstract. It is notably challenging to design an efficient and secure
signature scheme based on error-correcting codes. An approach to build
such signature schemes is to derive it from an identification protocol
through the Fiat-Shamir transform. All such protocols based on codes
must be run several rounds, since each run of the protocol allows a cheat-
ing probability of either 2/3 or 1/2. The resulting signature size is propor-
tional to the number of rounds, thus making the 1/2 cheating probability
version more attractive. We present a signature scheme based on double
circulant codes in the rank metric, derived from an identification pro-
tocol with cheating probability of 2/3. We reduced this probability to
1/2 to obtain the smallest signature among signature schemes based on
the Fiat-Shamir paradigm, around 22 KBytes for 128 bit security level.
Furthermore, among all code-based signature schemes, our proposal has
the lowest value of signature plus public key size, and the smallest se-
cret and public key sizes. We provide a security proof in the Random
Oracle Model, implementation performances, and a comparison with the
parameters of the most important code-based signature schemes.
Keywords: code-based cryptography · signature scheme · identification
protocol · Fiat-Shamir transform · rank metric
1 Introduction
Due to the early stage of post-quantum algorithm research, it is of paramount
importance to provide the full range of quantum secure cryptographic primi-
tives (signatures, key exchange, etc.) for all the main mathematical problems
cryptography relies on. This way, it will be easier to switch from one scheme to
the other in the case one of the problems turns out to be insecure in the quan-
tum model. Given that it is the oldest quantum resistant family and, hence, the
most thoroughly studied among all the contenders, code-based cryptography is
a strong candidate in the NIST competition to standardize quantum resistant
cryptographic algorithms [33].
This work focuses on code-based cryptography digital signature schemes.
Designing such schemes efficiently has been a grueling challenge and mainly
three different approaches have been followed, with very little success. Hash-
and-sign was introduced in pioneering work of Courtois, Finiasz, and Sendrier
[16], and is probably the most popular approach of the three. It is based on
the existence of a trapdoor which allows fast decoding, obtained by hiding a
structured code into a random linear code. Different choices of the underlying
code lead to different instantiations of the scheme. All hash-and-sign schemes
yield to small signatures (few thousands bits), but large public keys (order of
MBytes), in some cases even non-practical ones for 128 bit security level and
above. Furthermore, almost all these schemes have been attacked. The other two
approches avoid the use of trapdoors. The first is usually referred to as the KKS
(Kabatianskii-Krouk-Smeets) signature scheme [26], who later evolved in the
BMS (Barreto-Misoczki-Simplicio) scheme [9]. Both of them can be instantiated
on top of general linear codes. KKS and BMS have a good balance between public
key (few tens of thousands of bits) and signature size (few thousands of bits),
but they can only be considered one-time signature schemes. The third approach
uses the Fiat-Shamir transform to turn a zero-knowledge identification scheme
into a signature scheme, as initially proposed by Stern [37] in 1993. The main
drawback of such scheme is the large signature size. Many researchers followed
Stern approach, trying to improve either the signature or the key size of the
scheme.
In this manuscript, we provide a variation of a signature scheme based on
Stern approach, obtaining the smallest signature (sgn), secret and public key (pk)
sizes in the literature. Compared to other approaches used to build code-based
signature schemes, we also have the smallest |sgn| + |pk| value. We derive such
signature from a 5-pass identification protocol with cheating probability 1/2. We
provide a security proof in the Random Oracle Model, a detailed pseudo-code,
implementation performances, set of parameters for 80, 128, 192, and 256 bit of
classical security, and a comparison with the parameters of the most important
code-based signature schemes.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 provides an overview of previous
works and the ideas behind the scheme. In Sect. 3 we provide the notions that are
needed to understand the contribution. Sect. 4 presents our new identification
protocol. Sect. 5 sets the parameters of our signature schemes. Sect. 7 argues
about the theoretical complexity of the key generation, signature and verifica-
tion algorithms, providing also implementation details and performances. Sect. 6
shows a comparison of the parameters of our proposal and other well-known
code-based signature schemes, and Sect. 8 draws the conclusions.
2 Main idea
Commonly, cryptographic signature schemes whose security relies on the diffi-
culty of decoding a linear code are built by converting a 3 or a 5-pass iden-
tification protocol into a signature scheme via the Fiat-Shamir transform or a
generalization of it. The first to propose such paradigm was Stern [37]. In this
work, Stern exhibits a 3-pass identification protocol whose security is based on
the difficulty of decoding a random linear code and finding a hash collision, and
in which a cheater can correctly identify with a probability of 2/3. For this last
reason, the protocol should be run an appropriate number of rounds which de-
pends on the security level the scheme needs to reach. Since the corresponding
signature is proportional to the number of rounds, this means that this type of
approach yields to large signatures, of the order of hundreds of KBytes. The
basic idea of the protocol is that, given the parity-check matrix H of a linear
code as a public parameter, a random vector e of weight w, and a public key
s = eH , the prover needs to prove the knowledge of two properties, namely the
fact that the vector e is generating the syndrome s, and that e has Hamming
weight w. Adding a random commitment there are always two possibilities for
cheating among the three cases. In the same work, Stern shows how to reduce the
cheating probability to 1/2, by splitting the challenge step into two challenges,
the second of which adds a variation on e, forcing the protocol to perform 5
passes. Precisely, e was chosen as a codeword of a Reed-Muller code. Such trick
allows to almost halve the corresponding signature size, even though, with this
particular solution, there is a loss in efficiency. Stern signature schemes presents
very small secret keys (less than a thousand bits) and medium size public keys
(one hundred thousand bits).
Subsequent works aim at improving either key or signature sizes, by (1)
choosing a structured code rather than a random linear code, (2) changing the
variation performed on e, (3) working with the dual cryptosystem, or (4) working
in a different metric. In [41], Veron presents the dual of the 3-pass Stern proposal,
i.e. it uses the generator matrix G of a code, instead of the parity-check matrix
as a public parameter, and uses a pair (x, e) as a secret key, and a codeword
y = xG + e as a public key. This allows to send less data on average during
the response step, implying slightly shorter signatures. Later, Cayrel-Veron-El
Yousfi Alaoui (CVE) [15] presented a 5-pass identification protocol with cheating
probability of 1/2, using codes over F2m , rather than F2 as done by Stern and
Veron, and a scalar multiplication as the variation of e. In [17] it is shown
how to extend the Fiat-Shamir transform to a n-pass protocol (with n odd).
In 2011, Gaborit, Schrek and Ze´mor [23] presented the rank metric version of
the Stern identification protocol, decreasing significantly key and signature sizes,
due to the fact that rank metric decoding has quadratic exponential complexity,
while Hamming metric decoding is linear exponential. The same year, Aguilar,
Gaborit and Schrek [5], used double circulant codes in the Hamming metric
to reduce the key size of the Veron scheme, and presented a 5-pass version of
it, with cheating probability close to 1/2, performing a variation of e with a
circulant rotation of its two halves in the second challenge step. Furthermore,
they introduced a compression technique to reduce the signature size. Recently,
in [10], a rank metric version of Veron and CVE has been presented, though
lacking a security proof. We are not aware of any attack to any of the Fiat-Shamir
paradigm constructions, which probably have not received much attention from
the cryptographic community yet.
In this work, we present a rank metric version of the 5-pass Veron double
circulant signature scheme of [5], with a new variation performed on e, which
allows us to reach a cheating probability much closer to 1/2. Precisely, we adopt
a random linear combination of all possible rotations of e in the second challenge
step. We also present a compressed version of the scheme, which achieves signa-
ture sizes that are comparable to the one of post-quantum hash-based signature
schemes.
3 Preliminaries
In this section we provide the essential definition of the objects that are used in
our protocol.
A linear (n, k)q-code C is a vector subspace of (Fq)
n of dimension k, where
k and n are positive integers such that k < n, q is a prime power, and Fq is the
finite field with q elements. Elements of the vector space are called vectors or
words, while elements of the code are called codewords. A matrix G ∈ Fk×nq is
called a generator matrix of C if its rows form a basis of C, i.e. C = {x · G :
x ∈ (Fq)
k}. A matrix H ∈ F
(n−k)×n
q is called a parity-check matrix of C if
C = {x ∈ (Fq)
n : H · xT = 0}. Our schemes will use a special type of linear
codes, called double circulant codes, which are a special case of quasi-cyclic (or
circulant) codes (see e.g. [32]).
Definition 1 (Double Circulant Codes). Let n = 2k for an integer k. Con-
sider a vector x = (x1, x2) of (Fq)
n as a pair of two blocks of length k. An [n, k]
linear code C is Double Circulant (DC) if, for any c = (c1, c2) ∈ C, the vector
obtained after applying a simultaneous circular shift to both blocks c1, c2 is also
a codeword. More formally, by considering each block c1, c2 as a polynomial in
R = Fq[X ]/(X
n − 1), the code C is DC if for any c = (c1, c2) ∈ C it holds that
(X · c1, X · c2) ∈ C.
A systematic double circulant [n, k] code is a double circulant code with a
parity-check matrix of the form H = [Ik|A], where Ik is the identity matrix of
size k, and A is a k × k circulant matrix.
In this paper we work with codes in the rank metric. Given a fixed basis
b = {b1, . . . , bm} of (Fq)
m, a vector a ∈ (Fqm)
n can be represented as a matrix
with entries in Fq, by expanding each component of ai with respect to b in a
column (a1,i, . . . , am,i)
T . where ai =
∑m
j=1 aj,ibj , i = 1, . . . , n. We define the
rank of a vector as the rank of its matrix representation, with respect to b. We
denote the previous matrix representation as φb(a), and by φ
−1
b the inverse map.
In what follows, we will omit b as we consider it fixed.
To send a binary vector of a certain Hamming weight to any other vector
of the same Hamming weight, it is sufficient to apply a random permutation to
vector components. The map with the analogue property in the rank metric, i.e.
sending a vector of a certain rank to any other vector of the same rank, can be
defined as follows (see [23]).
Definition 2. Let Q ∈ Mm,m(Fq) be a q-ary matrix of size m × m, P ∈
Mn,n(Fq) be a q-ary matrix of size n×n, and v ∈ (Fqm)
n. We define the function
ΠP,Q such that ΠP,Q(v) = φ
−1(Q · φ(v) · P ), i.e.
ΠP,Q : (Fqm)
n 7→ (Fqm)
n
(v1, . . . , vn) 7→ (π1, . . . , πn)
where for h = 1, . . . , n,
πh := β1
∑m
i=1
∑n
j=1Q1,ivi,jPj,h + . . .+ βm
∑m
i=1
∑n
j=1Qm,ivi,jPj,h
It is proved in [23] that the following properties hold for ΠP,Q.
– For any x, y ∈ (Fqm)
n, P ∈Mn,n(Fq) and Q ∈Mm,m(Fq) then:
• (rank preservation) wR(ΠP,Q(x)) = wR(x);
• (linearity) aΠP,Q(x) + bΠP,Q(y) = ΠP,Q(ax+ by).
– For any x, y ∈ (Fqm)
n such that wR(x) = wR(y), it is possible to find P ∈
Mn,n(Fq) and Q ∈Mm,m(Fq) such that x = ΠP,Q(y).
Both in the Hamming and in the rank metric, random codes over Fq asymp-
totically achieve the Gilbert-Varshamov bound [20]. Furthermore, they have
close to optimal correction capability [28].
We now define the problems upon which the security of the schemes we
present is based.
Definition 3 (RSD Distribution). Given the positive integers n, k, and r,
the RSD(n, k, r) Distribution chooses H ←$ (Fqm)
(n−k)×n and x←$ (Fqm)
n such
that wR(x) = r, and outputs (H,H · x
T )
Problem 1 (RSD Problem). On input (H, yT ) ∈ (Fqm)
(n−k)×n×(Fqm)
n from the
RSD distribution, the Rank Syndrome Decoding problem RSD(n, k, r) asks to
find x ∈ (Fqm)
n such that H · xT = yT and wR(x) = r.
The previous problem can be defined correspondingly also in the Hamming met-
ric, in which setting the problem has been proven to be NP-complete [11]. The
RSD problem has recently been proven difficult with a probabilistic reduction
to the Hamming scenario in [4]. For cryptography, it is also useful to use the
Decisional version of the problem. Our scheme security depends on the difficulty
of solving the same RSD problem defined with Double Circulant codes, rather
than random linear codes. The decisional version of this problem is a special case
of the Decisional Rank s-Quasi Cyclic Syndrome Decoding Problem defined for
example in [4]. There is no known reduction from the search version of this prob-
lem to its decisional version. However, the best known attacks on the decisional
version of the problem remain the direct attacks on the search version of the
problem.
4 Veron Double Circulant identification protocol in the
rank metric
The scheme we present in this section, to which we refer to as the Rank Veron
Double Circulant (RVDC) identification protocol, mixes the ideas from [23],
where the Stern protocol is converted from Hamming to rank metric and the
function ΠP,Q (see Section 3 above) is introduced, and from [5], where the
cheating probability of the Veron protocol is improved from 2/3 to 1/2 using
the double circulant technique in the Hamming metric. In [5], the intermediate
challenge is a random parallel left rotation. To better exploit the rank metric
properties, and to make it more difficult to guess the challenge for an attacker,
we instead consider a random linear combination of all possible parallel left
rotations.
Definition 4. Let n = 2k and x = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ (Fqm)
k, y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈
(Fqm)
n. We denote with
roti((x1, . . . , xk)) = (xi+1, . . . , xk, x1, . . . , xi)
the left rotation of i positions of the vector x, and with
droti((y1, . . . , yi, yi+1, . . . , yk, yk+1, . . . , yk+i, yk+i+1, . . . , yk+k)) =
(yi+1, . . . , yk, y1, . . . , yi, yk+i+1, . . . , yk+k, yk+1, . . . , yk+i)
the parallel left rotation of i positions of the two halves of the vector y. Given
a = (α1, . . . , αk) ∈ (Fq)
k we also denote with Γ ′a(x) the linear combination of all
possible k left rotations of k− i positions of x, and Γa(y) the linear combination
of all possible k parallel left rotations of i positions of y
Γ ′a(x) =
k∑
i=1
αi · rotk−i(x) ∈ (Fqm)
k , Γa(y) =
k∑
i=1
αi · droti(y) ∈ (Fqm)
n .
The following lemma, used to prove the completeness of the scheme, can be
easily proven.
Lemma 1. Given the k × 2k generator matrix G of a double circulant linear
code and a vector x = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ (Fqm)
k, the following property holds
Γa(x ·G) = Γ
′
a(x) ·G
As we already noted in Section 3 a codeword y of a [2k, k] double circulant
code can be seen as the concatenation of two blocks, i.e. y = (y1, y2), of length
k. If we consider each block y1, y2 as a polynomial in R = Fq[X ]/(X
k − 1) then
the function (y1, y2) 7→ droti((y1, y2)) is equal to (y1, y2) 7→ (X
i · y1, X
i · y2),
where the multiplication by X i is performed in the ring, i.e. modulo Xk − 1.
Although there is no general complexity result for quasi-cyclic codes, their
decoding is considered to be difficult by the community. There exist structural
attacks which uses the cyclic structure of the code [35,25,24,30], but these attacks
have only a very limited impact on the practical complexity of the problem. These
attacks are especially efficient in the case when the polynomial Xn−1 has many
small factors. These attacks become inefficient as soon as Xn − 1 has only two
factors of the form (X−1) andXn−1+Xn−2+. . .+X+1, which is the case when
n is primitive in Fqm . The conclusion is that in practice, the best attacks are the
same as those for non-circulant codes up to a small factor. Another solution to
completely avoid such attacks is to use the ring R = Fq[X ]/(X
k − p(X)), where
p(X) is a polynomial with coefficients in Fq, and X
k − p(X) is irreducible over
Fq.
Recall that we will denote by λ the security level of the scheme. The key
generation algorithm is listed in Fig. 1. The RVDC identification protocol is
listed in Fig. 2.
RVDC: KGen(1λ)
1 : Define m,n, k, r as in Sect. 5
2 : x←$ (Fqm)
k
3 : e←$ (Fqm)
n s.t. wR(e) = r
4 : sk← (x, e)
5 : G←$ (Fqm)
n
6 : G′ ∈ (Fqm)
k×n ← Expand G in double circulant form
7 : y ← x ·G′ + e
8 : pk← (y,G, r)
9 : return sk, pk
Fig. 1. RVDC key generation algorithm in the rank metric
In Section C, we describe how to convert the identification protocol from
Fig. 2 into a signature scheme, to which we will refer to as Rank Veron Double
Circulant (RVDC) Signature scheme, using a generalization of the Fiat-Shamir
transform, introduced in [17]. The signature size of the scheme can be reduced
by applying the commitment compression technique used in [5]. We will call the
scheme resulting from this variation compressed Rank Veron Double Circulant
(cRVDC) scheme.
In Sect. B we prove that the identification protocol is complete, sound and
that the communication leaks no information on the secret key. The security of
RVDC scheme is based on a variant of the Rank Syndrome Decoding problem,
that we call Differential Rank Decoding Problem, defined as Problem 2 in the
same section.
5 Parameters choice
In this section we provide a set parameters for 80, 128, 192, 256 bit of classical
security, corresponding to 40, 64, 96, 128 bit of quantum security, the last three
falling into category 1, 3, and 5 in the NIST post-quantum competition.
The best generic combinatorial attack to solve the RSD problem has a com-
plexity ofO
(
(n− k)3m3qr
(k+1)m
n
−m
)
[8]. If k ≥
⌈
(r+1)(k+1)−(n+1)
r
⌉
, an algebraic
Prover Verifier
sk, pk = (x, e), (y,G, r) ← KGen pk
u←$ (Fqm )
k
Q←$Mm,m(Fq), P ←$Mn,n(Fq)
c1 ← H(P,Q)
c2 ← H(ΠP,Q(u ·G))
c1, c2
a = (α1, . . . , αk) ←$ (Fq)
k
,
a ai not all the same
c3 ← H(ΠP,Q(u ·G + Γa(e)))
c3
b b ←$ {0, 1}
if b = 0
r1 ← (P,Q), r2 ← u + Γ
′
a(x)
r1, r2 if c1 = H(r1)∧
c3 = H(Πr1 (r2 ·G + Γa(y))
return true
if b = 1
r1 ← ΠP,Q(u ·G), r2 ← ΠP,Q(Γa(e))
r1, r2 if c2 = H(r1)∧
c3 = H(r1 + r2)∧
wR(r2) = r
return true
Fig. 2. RVDC identification protocol in the rank metric
approach [21] is also possible to recover the error in O
(
r3k3qr⌈
(r+1)(k+1)−(n+1)
r ⌉
)
steps. Finally, to avoid specific Gro¨bner basis attacks, the condition n > r(k+1)
should hold. We choose the values m,n, k, r accordingly. As far as it concerns
post-quantum security, the author of [29], in line with [12], presents some ar-
guments showing that the post-quantum complexity of RSD is computed by
square-rooting the exponential term in the classical complexity formula.
Recall that for the case of double circulant code we have to choose n =
2k. As suggested in [37], it is better to choose r slightly below the theoretical
distance d provided by the Gilbert-Varshamov bound, in order to avoid possible
small rank attacks similar to small weight codewords attack such as [36]. We
choose m to be prime, so to have no subfields of F2m , which in other cases
leads to attacks. We also need to choose the number of rounds δ in order to
decrease the impersonation probability to our needs. As far as it concerns the
identification protocols, the impersonation probability of one single round for
RVDC is p = q
k+ρ
2qk with overwhelming probability. To reach a security level l
with an impersonation probability of p, i.e. to compute the number of round δ, we
need to set δ = logp(1/2
l). This results in δ = 81, 129, 193, 257, corresponding to
80, 128, 192, 256 bit security level in the classical scenario. In Table 1, we propose
4 sets of parameters, respectively for the 80, 128, 192, and 256 bit security level
in the classical scenario, for both RVDC and cRVDC signature schemes.
For all the proposed parameters it holds the condition k <
⌈
(r+1)(k+1)−(n+1)
r
⌉
,
so the algebraic attack of [21] must be taken into consideration while evaluating
the security.
In the table A = r3k3qr⌈
(r+1)(k+1)−(n+1)
r ⌉, B = (n − k)3m3qr
(k+1)m
n
−m, C =
r3k3qr⌈
(r+1)(k+1)−(n+1)
2r ⌉, D = (n− k)3m3qr
(k+1)m
2n −m,
Parameters Classic Attacks WF Quantum Attacks WF
λ q m n k r ρ δ h log2A log2 B log2 C log2 D
96 2 29 22 11 7 10 81 160 95.801 106.68 60.800 51.316
125 2 31 26 13 8 10 129 256 124.10 128.50 76.102 61.733
193 2 41 34 17 10 10 193 384 192.23 204.39 112.23 95.864
252 2 47 38 19 12 10 257 512 251.50 279.25 143.50 130.83
Table 1. RVDC and cRVDC parameters.
6 Key and signature size comparison
In Table 2 we report some key and signature bit sizes for other signature schemes
based on codes. In particular, we report the results of hash-and-sign signature
schemes such as Parallel-CFS [19], the three NIST competitors for signatures
based on codes, RankSign [22], RaCoSS [3], and pqsigRM [1], and Wave [18],
which has been proposed very recently. We also add the results from [7] regarding
the Hamming variants of Stern, Veron and CVE signature schemes, one entry for
the parameters proposed in [5] for the double circulant version of Veron scheme
in the Hamming metric, and one entry for the parameters proposed in [23] for
the rank version of Stern signature scheme. As far as it concerns the latter, we
remark that when the work was published, results from [21], [8], and [29] were
not known, so the security was believed to be 83 bits. While for the parameters
in [5], according the decoding complexity estimation of 20.097n given in [31], the
security of the scheme is about 68 bits, while in [5] was claimed to be 81. Recall
also that for all three NIST competitors some attacks have been found, so either
the parameters should be made larger or some modification of the scheme will
be proposed in the future.
For completeness, we also report key and signature size of one of the most
popular hash-based signature scheme, SPHINCS+, introduced in [13]. The pa-
rameters that we consider are from the NIST submission document [2]. We can
see that SPHINCS+ has signatures and keys that are from 2 to 5 times smaller
compared to cRVDC.
λ Scheme Metric Scheme parameters |sgn| |sk| |pk|
(m, t, δ, i)
81 Parallel-CFS [19] Hamm. (20, 8, 2, 3) 294 20 971 680 167 746 560
80 Parallel-CFS [19] Hamm. (17, 10, 2, 2) 196 2 228 394 22 253 340
(n, k, ω,Q)
177 RaCoSS [3] Hamm. (2400, 2060, 48, 0.07) 4800 5 760 000 816 000
177 RaCoSS(Compr.) [3] Hamm. (2400, 2060, 48, 0.07) 2436 1 382 400 816 000
(q,m, n, k, d, t, t′, r)
128 RankSign I [22] Rank (232, 21, 20, 10, 2, 2, 1, 8) 11 008 540 288 80 640
128 RankSign II [22] Rank (224, 24, 24, 12, 2, 2, 2, 10) 12 000 652 032 96 768
192 RankSign III [22] Rank (232, 27, 24, 12, 2, 3, 1, 10) 17 280 1 034 208 155 520
256 RankSign IV [22] Rank (232, 30, 28, 14, 2, 3, 2, 12) 23 424 1 527 360 228 480
(r,m, p, w)
128 pqsigRM-4-12 [1] Hamm. (4, 12, 16, 1295) 4 224 27 749 002 2 621 788
196 pqsigRM-6-12 [1] Hamm. (6, 12, 8, 311) 4 224 19 326 902 3 980 860
256 pqsigRM-6-13 [1] Hamm. (6, 13, 16, 1441) 8 320 16 777 216 84 020 992
(n, k, w, kU , kV )
128 Wave [18] Hamm. (5172, 3908, 4980, 2299, 1609) 8 326 na 7 840 000
(q, n, k, w, δ, h)
80 Stern [7] Hamm. (2, 768, 384, 76, 141, 160) 908 534 768 147 846
80 Veron [7] Hamm. (2, 768, 384, 76, 141, 160) 872 438 1 152 148 230
80 CVE [7] Hamm. (28, 144, 72, 55, 80, 160) 531 539 1 152 42 053
(n, k, i, w, δ, h)
68 Veron Double Circulant [5] Hamm. (698,349,19,70) 93 000 700 1050
(q,m, n, k, r, δ, h)
68 Rank Stern [23] Rank (2,20,20,11,3,137,160) na 400 2160
(q,m, n, k, r, ρ, δ, h)
96 RVDC Rank (2,29,22,11,7,10,81,160) 157 140 957 960
96 cRVDC Rank (2,29,22,11,7,10,81,160) 84 863 957 960
125 RVDC Rank (2,31,26,13,8,10,129,256) 334 626 1 209 1 212
125 cRVDC Rank (2,31,26,13,8,10,129,256) 179 854 1 209 1 212
193 RVDC Rank (2,41,34,17,10,10,193,384) 832 409 2 091 2 095
193 cRVDC Rank (2,41,34,17,10,10,193,384) 440 510 2 091 2 095
252 RVDC Rank (2,47,38,19,12,10,257,512) 1 437 915 2 679 2 683
252 cRVDC Rank (2,47,38,19,12,10,257,512) 762 935 2 679 2 683
(n, h, d, log t, k, w)
133 SPHINCS+-128s [2] - (16, 64, 8, 15, 10, 16) 64 640 512 256
128 SPHINCS+-128f [2] - (16, 60, 20, 9, 30, 16) 135 808 512 256
196 SPHINCS+-192s [2] - (24, 64, 8, 16, 14, 16) 136 512 768 384
195 SPHINCS+-192f [2] - (24, 66, 22, 8, 33, 16) 285 312 768 384
255 SPHINCS+-256s [2] - (32, 64, 8, 14, 22, 16) 238 336 1 024 512
254 SPHINCS+-256f [2] - (32, 68, 17, 10, 20, 16) 393 728 1 024 512
Table 2. Comparison of keys and signature bit sizes between our proposals and the
most popular code-based and hash-based signature schemes.
7 Performance
The cost of RVDC, and cRVDC key generation algorithm is dominated by the
multiplication of a vector to the generator matrix. Only one multiplication is
needed to generate the public key, and this makes the key generation particularly
fast. On the other hand, the cost of signature and verification algorithms are
dominated by the number of rounds and the cost of the underlying hash function.
In particular, in the RVDC scheme (see Appendix C), 3δ + 2 and 2δ + 2 hashes
have to be computed, respectively, for the signature and the verification. In the
cRVDC scheme, 3δ+3 and 2δ+3 hashes have to be computed, respectively, for
the signature and the verification.
In Table 3, we report the performance of our scheme on a MacBook Pro
equipped with a 2.9 GHz Intel Core i7 and a Huawei P20 Pro equipped with a
Kirin 970 supporting ARMv8 instructions. The implementation is using AVX2
or NEON instructions sets for the finite field arithmetic but not on any other
part of the code. The hash functions used are from the SHA2 family when the
digest size matched the requirements and SHAKE256 when a longer output was
needed. We also used AES-CTR-DRBG as a PRNG for random number gen-
eration. We compared our implementation with the optimized implementation
of SPHINCS+-SHAKE256 from SPHINCS+ NIST submission package. As ob-
served, our proposals outperform SPHINCS+ in all cases. The table entries are
in operations per second.
Macbook Pro Huawei P20 Pro
Scheme Security Level KGen Sign Vf KGen Sign Vf
RVDC 80 122706.66 333.27 1447.46 68023.54 153.42 607.5
cRVDC 80 122706.66 332.24 1420 68023.54 148.07 582.97
RVDC 128 94041.80 146.87 738.04 51771.48 76.93 299.02
cRVDC 128 94041.80 161.45 701.09 51771.48 74.1 315.97
SPHINCS+-128f 128 194.81 12.88 143.73 na na na
RVDC 192 47343.91 62 267.3 24982.4 32.79 130.31
cRVDC 192 47343.91 64.69 287.27 24982.4 31.61 129.87
SPHINCS+-192f 192 132.14 9.73 93.75 na na na
RVDC 256 28134.23 43.49 178.53 14157.74 19.79 81.46
cRVDC 256 28134.23 41.74 182.27 14157.74 19.08 80.33
SPHINCS+-256f 256 55.72 4.7 95.45 na na na
Table 3. RVDC and cRVDC operations per second.
8 Conclusions
We have presented two code-based signature schemes derived from a 5-pass iden-
tification protocol with cheating probability close to 1/2, using double circulant
codes in the rank metric. The second scheme optimizes the signature size from the
first one, at the cost of few hash computations. The resulting signature scheme
has a signature size of approximately 11, 22, 54, and 93 KBytes for a corre-
sponding security level of 96, 125, 193, and 254. When compared to one of the
most popular post-quantum hash-based signature schemes, namely SPHINCS+,
the key generation algorithm is between 350 and 500 times faster, the signing
algorithm is approximately ten times faster, and the verification algorithm is
twice as fast.
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A Post-quantum security of the Fiat-Shamir transform
It is well known that the Fiat-Shamir transform is secure in the random oracle
model (ROM), see e.g. [27]. However, when the adversary has a quantum access
to the oracle, i.e. in the quantum random oracle model (QROM), the situation
is somehow more complex, and recently many results have been published (e.g.
[14], [39], [27], [40]). Since most of the schemes we compare to do not take into
account this scenario, we also omit it, and leave it to future research.
An alternative quantum secure transform by Unruh [39] could be used instead
of the Fiat-Shamir one, yielding though a considerably less efficient signature,
since multiple executions of the underlying identification scheme are required.
In [40], it is proven that if a sigma-protocol has honest-verifier zero-knowledge
and statistical soundness with a dual-mode hard instance generator, then the re-
sulting Fiat-Shamir signature scheme is unforgeable in the quantum scenario. It
is easy to see that our proposal has a dual-mode hard instant generator and
honest-verifier (computational) zero-knowledge, but on the other hand, a com-
putationally unbounded adversary would prevent us from achieving statistical
soundness. Thus, we cannot apply the results of [40] to our proposal. Still, to
the best of our knowledge, no quantum attack has been published to Veron-like
constructions.
B Zero-knowlegde properties of RVDC signature scheme
In this section we prove the security of RVDC scheme by showing how the com-
pleteness, soundness and zero-knowledge properties are achieved. In the proofs
we follow [5].
Completeness Given (sk, pk) output from KGen function, it easy to see that
for any possible sk = (x, e) the Verifier always accepts after interacting with the
Prover P on common input pk. This is because the honest Prover who knows sk
is be able to construct the three commitments c1, c2, c3. Furthermore, the Verifier
is always able to identify the Prover because the verifications match with the
given commitments.
In particular, the check on the value c3 when b = 0 is valid because of
Lemma 1, i.e. Γa(x ·G) = Γ
′
a(x) ·G. Thanks to this we have that u ·G+Γa(e) =
u ·G+ Γa(x ·G) + Γa(y) = u ·G+ Γ
′
a(x) ·G+ Γa(y) = (u+ Γ
′
a(x)) ·G+ Γa(y).
Notice also that the components of the first challenge a cannot be all the
same, otherwise wR(Γa(e)) = 0 or 2, depending of a being equal to (0, . . . , 0),
(a˜, . . . , a˜) respectively, and the check when b = 1 would fail.
Soundness We will show that if someone can be successfully identified by V
with the protocol, then it is able to retrieve the secret in polynomial time with a
certain probability. To do so, we introduce a specific problem which is easier to
be solved than the syndrome decoding, 3 except when there is only one solution,
in which case the two problems are the same. The way in which we assure the
security is by choosing the parameters which allow to decrease the size of the
solutions of the new problem to one with a probability exponentially close to 1
(in practice, this probability to have more than one solution is 2λ).
Problem 2 (Differential Rank Decoding Problem). Consider H a random dou-
ble circulant matrix, Y a random codeword in (Fq)
n of rank weight r, and
A = {a1, . . . , aρ} ⊆ (Fq)
k, with aj all distinct for j = 1, . . . , ρ, and aj =
(α1, . . . , αk), with α1, . . . , αk all distinct. Let H · Y
T be a syndrome. The prob-
lem P(H,Y ρ,A, r) consists in finding ρ words zj and a constant C such that
H · Γaj (Y )
T −H · zTj = C, and wR(zj) = r for all j < ρ.
The above mentioned problem is easier than the independent syndrome de-
coding problem, because of the addition of the unknown C. However, it still
seems to be hard to be solved. Note that we can suppose that there exist a
particular solution Z1, . . . , Zρ, C to the problem P(H,Y ρ,A, r), such that C is
equal to 0. In this case, we have to solve the usual rank syndrome decoding
problem H · Γaj (Y )
T = H · zTj for all j < i.
Lemma 2 gives the probability to find a solution of Problem 2
Lemma 2. Consider ρ,A, r fixed. Let ZC = (Z1, . . . , Zρ, C) be a random vector
with Zj, 1 ≤ j ≤ ρ a random variable with uniform distribution over the words of
rank weight r, and C a random variable with uniform distribution over (Fqm)
n−k.
Let Sρ be a random variable equal to the set of the solutions of the problem
P(H,Y ρ,A, r), ρ,A, r as in Problem 2. Note that Sρ is a random variable, in
the sense that Sρ is defined relatively to H a random double circulant matrix and
Y a random word of weight r. We have Pr[ZC ∈ Sρ ] =
1
(qm(n−k))ρ
.
Proof.
Pr[ZC ∈ Sρ ] =
= Pr
[
H · ZT1 = C +H · Γa1(X)
T ∩ . . . ∩H · ZTρ = C +H · Γaρ(X)
T
]
,
3 This problem is the analog of the Differential Syndrome Decoding Problem (denoted
Proble`me de de´codage par syndrome diffe´rentiel) in [34], for the Hamming metric.
The same problem is used in [5].
which, by the conditional probability formula, is the product of the following
two probabilities
Pr

H · ZT1 = C +H · Γa1(X)T |
ρ⋂
j=2
H · ZTj = C +H · Γaj (X)
T

 ·
Pr

 ρ⋂
j=2
H · ZTj = C +H · Γaj (X)
T

 .
In the case where the words of rank weight r do not have a common image for
H , we have that:
Pr[ZC ∈ Sρ ] =Pr

H · ZT1 = C +H · Γa1(X)T |
ρ⋂
j=2
Z1 6= Zj

 ·
Pr

 ρ⋂
j=2
H · ZTj = C +H · Γaj (X)
T

 .
These variables are independent, so
Pr[ZC ∈ Sρ ] =
= Pr
[
H · ZT1 = C +H · Γa1(X)
T
]
· Pr

 ρ⋂
j=2
H · ZTj = C +H · Γaj (X)
T

 .
Using a recursive argument, we have that
Pr[ZC ∈ Sρ ] = Pr
[
H · ZT1 = C
]ρ
.
The hardness of the Decisional Rank Double Circulant Syndrome Decoding
(DRDCSD) Problem (Defined in [4]) assures that the syndromes associated to
codewords of given rank are indistinguishable from random syndromes, i.e. they
are uniformly distributed among the syndrome space (Fqm)
n−k. Thus, we can
conclude that
Pr[ZC ∈ Sρ ] =
1
(qm(n−k))ρ
.
⊓⊔
Lemma 3. The distribution of Nρ describing the size of Sρ is the same of the
variable 1+ Y , with Y a binomial distribution with parameters N = (qm(n−k) −
1)
[
n
r
]ρ
and p = 1
(qm(n−k))ρ
. Furthermore
E[Nρ] = Np+ 1 = (q
m(n−k) − 1)
( [
n
r
]
qm(n−k)
)ρ
.
Proof. Let ZC = (Z1, . . . , Zρ, C) be the random vector defined in Lemma 2,
with C 6= 0 and TC the variable equal to 1 when ZC ∈ Sρ and 0 otherwise.
Nρ =
∑
C 6=0 TC +T0, with T0 the number of solutions when C = (0, . . . , 0). The
variable T0 is equal to 1 since for a given C and ρ distinct codewords of rank
weight r only one solution can be found. The number of words of given rank
weight r is given by the number of vector subspaces of length n and dimension
r, which is indicated with
[
n
r
]
(defined in Section 3), while the number of all
possible C 6= (0, . . . , 0) is qm(n−k)−1. So, we have Nρ = 1+Y with Y a binomial
distribution with parameters N = (qm(n−k) − 1)
[
n
r
]ρ
and p = 1
(qm(n−k))ρ
. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. Let Y ′ be a random variable with Poisson distribution with param-
eter Np. Then we have Pr[Nρ = 1] ≈ Pr[Y
′ = 0] ≈ 1−
[nr]
ρ
qm(n−k)(ρ−1)
.
Proof. For a sufficiently large N and sufficiently small p, the binomial distribu-
tion of Y ′ is approximated by the Poisson distribution with parameter λ = Np.
We can deduce that the probability Pr[Nρ = 1] ≈ Pr[Y
′ = 0] = e−Np (Np)
0
0! ≈
e
−
[nr]
ρ
qm(n−k)(ρ−1) . When x is closed to 0, we have that ex ≈ 1 − x, and thus
Pr[Nρ = 1] ≈ 1−
[nr]
ρ
qm(n−k)(ρ−1)
. ⊓⊔
Let us call ǫ the value 1−
[nr]
ρ
qm(n−k)(ρ−1)
.
Lemma 5. If someone is able to solve the problem P(H,Y ρ,A, r) with proba-
bility ǫ′, then he is also able to find the secret key of the protocol from the public
key with a probability of about ǫǫ′.
Proof. We have from Lemma 4 that the probability that the solution of P(H,Y ρ,A, r)
is unique is ǫ. ⊓⊔
Theorem 1. If a prover P is able to be authenticated by a a verifier V with
a probability greater than q
k+ρ
2qk
, then P is able to retrieve the secret key of the
protocol from the public key with a probability greater than 1 −
[nr]
ρ
qm(n−k)(ρ−1)
in
polynomial time or to find a collision on the underlying hash function in a poly-
nomial time.
Proof. The prover P is able to correctly answer more than k+ρ challenge queries.
In this case, let us call a, b, respectively, the first and the second challenge of V.
First P randomly chooses P ∈ Mn,n(Fq), Q ∈ Mm,m(Fq), and v ∈ (Fqm)
n, and
sends the first two commitments c1 = H(P,Q) and c2 = H(v) to V.
We call c3 the second commitment sent to V.
We also call (ua, Pa, Qa) and (va, za) the last response, respectively, when
b = 0, and when b = 1. For the Pigeonhole principle, P is able to answer to
the challenge (a, b = 0) and (a, b = 1) for at least ρ different a, which we call
a1, . . . , aρ. V must verify that H(Paj , Qaj) = c1 and H(vaj ) = c2. Thus, for any
j ∈ {1, . . . , ρ}, either P finds a collision of the hash function, or (Paj , Qaj ) =
(P,Q) and vaj = v for all aj . V must also verify that the rank weight of zaj
equals r and that the commitment c3 is correct. To meet this last condition, the
values P,Q, uaj , v, zaj generated by P must satisfy the condition H(ΠP,Q(uajG+
Γaj (y))) = H(v+zaj ), since both side of the equation must be equal to c3. Thus,
either P finds a collision of the hash function, or ΠP,Q(uajG+Γaj (y)) = v+ zaj .
In this case, we deduce that uajG + Γaj (y) = Π
−1
P,Q(v) + Π
−1
P,Q(zaj ), and then
H ·Γaj (y)
T −H ·Π−1P,Q(zaj ) = H ·Π
−1
P,Q(v)
T . Since H ·Γaj (y)
T = H ·Γaj (e)
T , the
previous equation corresponds to the problem P(H,Y ρ,A, r). We deduce from
Lemma 5 that P is able to find the secret key with a probability greater than
ǫ. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2. If a prover P is able to be authenticated by a verifier V with a
probability greater than
(
qk+ρ
2qk
)N
, then P is able to retrieve the secret key of
the protocol from the public key with a probability greater than 1 −
[nr]
ρ
qm(n−k)(ρ−1)
in polynomial time or to find a collision on the underlying hash function in a
polynomial time.
Proof. P is able to build c1,1, . . . , c1,N and c2,1, . . . , c2,N such that it can be au-
thenticated with a probability greater than
(
qk+ρ
2qk
)N
. For the Pigeonhole princi-
ple, we can deduce the existence of an integer j such that P can be authenticated
by the first protocol with a probability greater than q
k+ρ
2qk
. Theorem 1 allows to
conclude the proof. ⊓⊔
Zero-Knowledge We need to prove that, beside the public parameters, no in-
formation can be deduced in polynomial time from an execution of the protocol.
We need to construct a polynomial time simulator S of the protocol that, by
interacting with the verifier V , provides a transcript which is indistinguishable
from the one of the original protocol.
The simulator S should perform the following steps
– if b = 0:
• choose random P ′ ∈Mn,n(Fq), Q
′ ∈Mm,m(Fq), and v ∈ (Fqm)
n;
• choose random a′ ∈ (Fq)
k;
• compute h1 = H(P
′, Q′), and h3 = H(ΠP ′,Q′(v ·G+ Γa′(y))).
Note that P ′, Q′, v are indistinguishable from P,Q, u+ Γa′(x);
– if b = 1:
• choose random P ′ ∈ Mn,n(Fq), Q
′ ∈ Mm,m(Fq), v ∈ (Fqm)
n, and z ∈
(Fqm)
n such that wR(z) = r;
• compute h2 = H(ΠP ′,Q′(v)), and h3 = H(ΠP ′,Q′(v) + z).
Note that ΠP ′,Q′(v), z are indistinguishable from ΠP,Q(u ·G), ΠP,Q(Γa′(e)),
since, if P,Q are random matrices, then the function ΠP,Q can map a vector
of a certain rank to any vector of the same rank. Furthermore, the function
Γa preserves the rank.
The simulator just described runs in polynomial time.
Remark: notice that Stern-like schemes as usually presented are only weak-
testable zero knowledge (see [6, Sect. 3.2]). They can be straightforwardly turned
into a full ZK scheme following [38, Theorem 3 and 4].
C Veron Double Circulant Signature schemes in the rank
metric
In this section we provide the description of the signature scheme derived from
Veron identification protocol using double circulant codes (Section 4), which we
will refer to as Rank Veron Double Circulant (RVDC) Signature scheme. We also
consider a version of the scheme with a signature compression, and we refer to
it as compressed Rank Veron Double Circulant (cRVDC) signature scheme.
Signature and verification algorithm for the RVDC and cRVDC schemes can
be observed, respectively, in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. Key generation is the same as in
Sect. 4.
In the algorithm in Fig. 3, if δk log2(q) is greater than h, then it is possible
to compute the challenge as ch ← H(cmt‖msg‖1)‖ . . . ‖H(cmt‖msg‖l) ∈ (F2)
l·h,
where l ← ⌊δk log2(q)/h⌋ + 1. Alternatively, one may use an Extended Output
Function (XOF), as shown in Fig. 4, where XOF(x)l means that we take l bits
from the output of the function XOF with input x.
RVDC: Sign(sk, pk,msg, δ)
sk = (x, e) ← KGen
pk = (y,G, r) ← KGen
msg, message
δ, number of rounds as defined in Sect. 5
1 : for i = 1..δ do
2 : ui ←$ (Fqm )
k
3 : Pi ←$Mn,n(Fq), Qi ←$Mm,m(Fq)
4 : ci,1 ← H(Pi, Qi)
5 : ci,2 ← H(ΠPi,Qi (ui ·G))
6 : cmt0 ← c1,1‖c1,2‖ . . . ‖cδ,1‖cδ,2
7 : ch1 ← H(cmt0‖msg)
8 : Truncate rightmost bits in ch1
so that it has δk log2(q) bits
and there is no block of length k log2(q)
with all equal components over Fq.
9 : for i = 1..δ do
10 : ai ←
(
ch1,(i−1)k log2(q)+1, . . . , ch1,ik log2(q)
)
11 : ci,3 ← H
(
ΠPi,Qi
(
ui ·G + Γai (e)
))
12 : cmt1 ← c1,3‖ . . . ‖cδ,3
13 : ch2 ← H(cmt1)
14 : for i = 1..δ do
15 : if ch2,i = 0
16 : ri,1 ← (Pi, Qi)
17 : ri,2 ← ui + Γ
′
ai
(x)
18 : if ch2,i = 1
19 : ri,1 ← ΠPi,Qi (ui ·G)
20 : ri,2 ← ΠPi,Qi (Γai (e))
21 : sgn ← [cmt0, cmt1, r]
22 : return sgn
RVDC: Verify(pk,msg, δ, sgn)
pk = (y,G, r)← KGen
msg, message
δ, number of rounds as defined in Sect. 5
sgn = [cmt0, cmt1, r], signature
1 : ch1 ← H(cmt0‖msg)
2 : ch2 ← H(cmt1)
3 : for i = 1..δ do
4 : ai ← (ch1,(i−1)k log2(q)+1, . . . , ch1,ik log2(q))
5 : ci,3 ← cmt1,[h(i−1)+1,...,hi]
6 : if ch2,i = 0
7 : ci,1 ← cmt0,[2h(i−1)+1,...,2h(i−1)+h]
8 : if ci,1 6= H(ri,1)∨
9 : ci,3 6= H(Πri,1 (ri,2 ·G + Γai (y))
10 : return false
11 : if ch2,i = 1
12 : ci,2 ← cmt0,[2h(i−1)+h+1,...,2hi]
13 : if ci,2 6= H(ri,1)∨
14 : ci,3 6= H(ri,1 + ri,2) ∨ wR(ri,2) 6= r
15 : return false
16 : return true
Fig. 3. RVDC signature and verification algorithms.
cRVDC: Sign(sk, pk,msg, δ)
sk = (x, e) ← KGen
pk = (y,G, r) ← KGen
msg, message
δ, number of rounds as defined in Sect. 5
/ Step 1
1 : for i = 1..δ do
2 : ui ←$ (Fqm )
k
3 : seedi ←$ {0, . . . , 2
λ − 1}
4 : Pi ← XOF(1, seedi)n2
5 : Qi ← XOF(2, seedi)m2
6 : ci,1 ← XOF(Pi, Qi)2λ
7 : ci,2 ← XOF(ΠPi,Qi (ui ·G))2λ
8 : cmt0 ← XOF(c1,1‖c1,2‖ . . . ‖cδ,1‖cδ,2)2λ
/ Step 2
9 : ch1 ← XOF(cmt0‖msg)δk log2(q)
/ Step 3
10 : for i = 1..δ do
11 : ai ←
(
ch1,(i−1)k log2(q)+1, . . . , ch1,ik log2(q)
)
12 : ci,3 ← XOF
(
ΠPi,Qi
(
ui ·G + Γai (e)
))
2λ
13 : cmt1 ← c1,3‖ . . . ‖cδ,3
/ Step 4
14 : ch2 ← XOF(cmt1)2λ
/ Step 5
15 : for i = 1..δ do
16 : if ch2,i = 0
17 : ri,1 ← ui + Γ
′
ai
(x)
18 : ri,2 ← seedi
19 : ri,3 ← ci,2
20 : if ch2,i = 1
21 : ri,1 ← ΠPi,Qi (ui ·G)
22 : ri,2 ← Coordinates of ΠPi,Qi (Γai (e))
23 : ri,3 ← ci,1
24 : sgn ← [cmt0, cmt1, r]
25 : return sgn
cRVDC: Verify(pk,msg, δ, sgn)
pk = (y,G, r)← KGen
msg, message
δ, number of rounds as defined in Sect. 5
sgn = [cmt0, cmt1, r], signature
1 : ch1 ← XOF(cmt0‖msg)2λ
2 : ch2 ← XOF(cmt1)2λ
3 : for i = 1..δ do
4 : ai ← (ch1,(i−1)k log2(q)+1, . . . , ch1,ik log2(q))
5 : ci,3 ← cmt1,[h(i−1)+1,...,hi]
6 : if ch2,i = 0
7 : P
′
← XOF(1, ri,2)n2
8 : Q′ ← XOF(2, ri,2)m2
9 : ci,1 ← XOF(P
′
, Q
′)2λ
10 : ci,2 ← ri,3
11 : if ci,3 6= XOF(ΠP ′,Q′ (ri,1 ·G + Γai (y))2λ
12 : return false
13 : if ch2,i = 1
14 : ci,1 ← ri,3
15 : ci,2 ← XOF(ri,1)2λ
16 : if ci,3 6= XOF(ri,1 + ri,2) ∨ wR(ri,2)2λ 6= r
17 : return false
18 : if cmt0 = XOF(c1,1‖c1,2‖ . . . ‖cδ,1‖cδ,2)2λ
19 : return true
Fig. 4. cRVDC signature and verification algorithms.
